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)
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JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN,

CASE NO. 870389

;
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)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This appeal stems from a Jury Verdict finding the Defendant
guilty of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony [U.C.A., section
76-6-302], Theft, a second degree felony [U.C.A., section 76-6-404],
and Possession of a Firearm, a third degree felony [U.C.A., section
76-10-503].

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to

U.C.A., section 78-2-2(3)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED OH APPEAL
The Defendant/Appellant states the following error, on the part
of the trial court, and issues as grounds for his appeal:
1.

The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's

motion for continuance of trial where the trial date was moved up
some two (2) weeks, the Defendant needed additional time to attempt
to locate out of state witnesses, and where the Defendant waived his
speedy trial rights.
2.

The trial court abused its discretion by empaneling

venireman who were too closely aligned, both through business and

personal relationships, with the county attorney thus denying the
Defendant his constitutional rights pursuant to Article I, Sections
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in a three count information with: 1)
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony [U.C.A., section 76-6-302];
2) Theft, a second degree felony [U.C.A., section 76-6-404], and; 3)
Possession of a Firearm, a third degree felony [U.C.A., section
76-10-503].
The charges stem from the robbery of Suttons of Park City, a
jewelry store in Park City, Utah.
An individual, allegedly the Defendant, upon entering the
jewelry store to pick up a necklace left the day before to be
cleaned, pulled a gun and ordered the clerk of the store to empty all
items of jewelry into a briefcase.

The criminal then fled the store

locking the clerk in the back room of the store.
A composite drawing of a suspect was made and Defendant's
picture was picked out of a photo line-up by the store clerk.
Several days later the Defendant and another individual
purchased a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette in Salt Lake City, Utah for in
excess of $10,000.00 in cash.
Defendant was eventually apprehended and arraigned on the above
described charges. The Defendant's Preliminary Hearing was held on
June 16, 1987 before the Honorable Maurice D. Jones; the Defendant
was bound over to stand trial in the District Court on all charges.
<R«*>
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Defendant was tried before a jury in Coalville, Utah on
September 9 and 10, 1987 before District Judge Homer F. Wilkinson.
After hearing the testimony and being instructed by the Judge,
the jury retired for a total of 7 1/2 minutes before returning its
verdict of guilty on all three charges.

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
1.

Pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Continuance and after

weighing and balancing the Constitutional rights of the Defendant, to
summons witnesses in his behalf at trial, against the prejudice
created by delaying the Defendant's trial, the trial court abused its
discretion by denying defendant's motion for continuance. This was an
abuse of discretion because Defendant's trial date was moved up some
two (2) weeks, the Defendant needed additional time to attempt to
locate out of state witnesses, the Defendant waived his speedy trial
rights and the State would suffer no prejudice by the delay.
2.

The trial court abused its discretion by empaneling

venireman who were too closely aligned, both through business and
personal relationships, with the county attorney thus denying the
Defendant his constitutional rights pursuant to Article I, Sections
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

Of the 23 member jury panel, nine stated

on voir dire that they had previous business and/or personal
relationships with the County Attorney trying the case for the State,
and of those nine individuals, three were eventually seated on the
jury.
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ARGUMENTS

POINT I,
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL
Defendant filed a Motion for Continuance of Trial (R«J7-^S)
requesting that the September 9, 1987 trial date be continued so as
to allow him to contact several out of state witnesses to testify on
his behalf.

Defendant alleges that he was not able to this due to

his incarceration in the Salt Lake County Jail and limited phone
access, and due to his trial date being moved up by some two weeks.
(R3o^3uX).

Further, the Defendant was willing to waive his speedy

trial rights and detainer time. (RW6^9)
The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska in the case of SALAZAR
v. STATE. 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska, 1976) stated that: "...while there is
no well established standard for determining when a denial [of
motion

for

continuance

of

trial]

a

has been arbitrary, we are not

without guidelines for making such a determination. ...the primary
focus of inquiry must be on the reason for the requested continuance.
We now articulate additional factors which are among those that the
trial Court should consider on a request to enable a party to secure
further testimony.... 1) Whether the testimony is material to the
case; 2) whether the testimony can be elicited from any other source;
3) whether the testimony is cumulative; 4) probability of securing
the absent witness in a reasonable time; 5) whether the requesting
party was diligent and acting in good faith; 6) the inconvenience of
the courts and/or others; 7) the likelihood that the testimony would
have affected the jury's verdict." (at pg. 72)
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These are factors which the trial court ih this present case
should have looked at but did not.

If the Court had looked at these

factors it would have been clear that the Defendant was requesting a
continuance of the trial date for one main reason - to be allowed
time to contact his witnesses and secure their presence at the time
of trial.
When this situation is combined with the fact that the
transcripts of the preliminary hearing were not delivered to
counsel's office until the night before trial (Rl36/*j6) and that the
trial date was moved up some two (2) weeks (R3c>^33l ), Defendant's
request for a continuance of the trial date was timely, for good
cause, and the denial of the motion for continuance infringes on the
Defendant's constitutional rights guaranteed under the Utah state and
Federal Constitutions.

the Defendant was deprived of an opportunity

to present testimony material to his defense. (BANKS v. STATE. 710
P.2d 723; Nevada, 1985; CQLGAIN v. STATE. 719 P.2d 1263; Nevada,
1986)
PQIHT II,
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EMPANELING
VENIREMAN WHO WERE TOO CLOSELY ALIGNED, BOTH THROUGH
BUSINESS AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, WITH THE COUNTY
ATTORNEY
It is a well accepted legal principle, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, that an individual is entitled to
a fair and impartial jury trial by one's peers.
The jury empaneled in the Appellant's case, by its mere
composition of individuals who were too closely aligned with the
County Attorney through business and personal relationships, on its
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face denies the Defendant of these constitutional rights.
The concept upon which the Defendant relies in this case is best
stated in STATE v. BROOKS. 563 P.2d 789 (Utah, 1977):

"Article I,

Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, in mandatory terms,
guarantees the accused in a criminal proceeding the right to a trial
by an impartial jury.

'Impartiality' is not a technical concept but

is a state of mind; it is a mental attitude of appropriate
indifference. A jury, in its role as fact finder, must weigh the
evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. A juror, who
through a personal association with a witness or a party has
developed a relationship of affection, respect, or esteem, cannot be
deemed disinterested, indifferent, impartial. ...A juror is not in
any position to weigh the evidence of his friend against the evidence
of strangers and of the defendant so as to strike a balance between
them as the law requires.... Where there have been personal
associations, such as the ones here; to remain uninfluenced,
unbiased, and unprejudiced, runs counter to human nature." (at pgs.
801-802)
This is the disagreement that the Defendant has with the jury
venire and jury panel in his case - the personal and professional
relationships with the County Attorney were of such a nature that
"...to remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced, runs counter
to human nature."

As such, Defendant was denied a trial by a fair

and impartial jury.
In support of this argument, the record would show that :

1)

Nine of the 23 members of the jury panel claimed they knew the County
Attorney (i.e. Ward Member, Son's Coach, Performed legal work for
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spouse, County Attorney's doctor, etc.).

Of these Nine, three were

seated on the jury including Juror No. 3 who was a fellow Ward Member
and Juror No. 16 who son was coached by the County Attorney; 2) One
of the Jury members, No. 16, knows two (2) of the police witnesses;
3) Ten of the 23 members of the jury panel, three of whom were seated
on the jury, had been victims of thefts.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY
In violation of the Defendant's rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, Defendant supplements the
argument set forth above under Point II by pointing out that the jury
deliberated only seven and one half (7 1/2 minutes) which was not
even sufficient time to read the 26 Jury Instructions upon which they
were to base their deliberations.
This buttresses the arguments made above under Point II that "A
juror is not in any position to weigh the evidence of his friend
against the evidence of strangers and of the defendant so as to
strike a balance between them as the law requires.... Where there
have been personal associations, such as the ones here; to remain
uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced, runs counter to human
nature."
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing grounds, and based upon the foregoing
arguments, Appellant requests that this Court:
1.

Reverse the Defendant's convictions;

2*

Remand the case to the district Court for a new trial

consistent with the Supreme Court's findings*
Dated this 9th day of May, 1988.

Respectfully Submitted,

(

INE, Attorney for
fendant
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